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Chapter I 
 
Regional Development Policy and Local-Head Elections 
 
by 
 
Kazuhisa Matsui 
 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The process of democratization of the government system in Indonesia started in 1998.  
In the past ten years, Indonesia has evolved to become a democratic country from an 
authoritarian one. In this process, the parliament has amended the 1945 Constitution 
four times. Ultimately, Indonesia was able to hold its first presidential and 
vice-presidential direct elections in 2004 and the local-head direct elections in 2005. 
Who could ever predict such rapid change would happen in the Indonesian government 
system, particularly for those who have long witnessed the authoritarian system of the 
government under the New Order regime? Under such rapid process of democratization, 
Indonesia transformed itself from the authoritarian system to a parliamentary system, 
and to a presidential system starting from the central government to the regional level. 
   Before this change of government system, Indonesia tried to apply the regional 
autonomy under the decentralization scheme in its initial legal framework by ratifying 
Law No. 22/1999 regarding Local Government, and Law No. 25/1999 concerning 
Fiscal Balance between the Central and the Local Government. These two legislations 
were effective on January 1, 2001 with the implementation regulations including 
Ordinance No. 25/2000 on Central and Provincial Government Authority as an 
Autonomous Region1. Under these Laws and Regulations, the full authority, that was 
once managed and held by the central government, was handed over to the regions, 
particularly to the District/Municipality governments. 
                                                   
1 In Law No. 25/2000, the authority of the District/Municipality Government was not stipulated, since all 
the power, except the authority of Central and Provincial Government, was regarded as the authority of 
the District/Municipality. Because of the ambiguity, Law No. 32/2004 was issued to specify in more 
detail the authority of the District/Municipality. 
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 Under these legislations, Indonesia immediately had to face several issues and 
challenges on a trial-and-error basis, primarily in the division of authority or affairs 
between the Central and the Local Government. Another issue is the degree of 
competence in managing regional autonomy in region, including the Regional 
Ordinance (Peraturan Daerah: Perda) that often impede a conducive business climate 
and that hamper capital investment in the region. In 2004, the central government 
amended the two legislations by issuing Law No. 32/2004 on Regional Governance and 
Law No. 33/2004 on Regional Fiscal Balance between Central and Local Government2. 
 The decentralization process in Indonesia is closely related to the trend of 
democratization and the functional shift of the government. Formerly, the government 
served as “an institution to control and regulate the people”, but today it serves as 
“public service institutions for the people”. There is ample evidence of this shift in the 
development administration and practice in the regions. 
 The process of decentralization and regional autonomy has given a new nuance - that 
is the local-head elections, elected directly by the people since 2005. The local-head 
election is regarded as one of the components of democratization after the fall of the 
New Order regime. Along with the presidential and vice-presidential direct elections in 
2004, the Indonesian political system drastically changed to a presidential system as 
opposed to a parliamentary system starting from the central/national level down to the 
District/Municipality level. This system is quite similar to the system applied in the 
United States of America. Under this system, automatically the role of the top manager, 
i.e. the president or the local-head, plays a significant role in determining the national or 
regional development outcome such as the practice in a business company. 
 To what extent does the change of such political system affect the planning and 
implementation of the regional development policy in the era of regional autonomy 
nowadays? This is the basic question in this study.   
 Does the political system - that is now based on local-head elections - stimulate or 
inhibit the planning and implementation of the development policy as compared to the 
former system? Has the society’s role or participation significantly progressed in the 
process of planning and implementation of the regional development? Does it stimulate 
competition among the regions to produce policies that attract investments? Does it 
challenge the regions to formulate better methods or approaches on regional 
development? After running the local-head elections, will the practice of corruption - 
                                                   
2 Ratnawati (2006) initiated a revision on Law No. 32/2004, saying that “the drafter of the Law (No. 
32/2004) regards the regions as service-provider technical units rather than autonomous political units. 
This is a setback towards the establishment of a democratic, independent and prosperous regional 
autonomy and local-community autonomy within the corridor of the Republic of Indonesia”. This view 
was a reaction upon the change of the term “authority” (kewenangan) in Law No. 22/1999 to the word 
“affairs” (urusan) in Law No. 32/2004. However, the provision of public service should be attributed to 
the minimum service standard or the national minimum standard service that all peoples are entitled to 
receive and that the government must be accountable for. 
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that is often considered to spread to the regions - be reduced in line with the 
improvement on regional development?  Will the relationship between the government 
and its people be more amiable and in harmony in terms of implementing regional 
development? Is there a strong possibility to revive an authoritarian government? 
 This study analyzes the relationship between decentralization, regional development 
policy and local-head elections particularly in Eastern Region of Indonesia (KTI). KTI 
has always been considered as the backward region. The gap between the regions in 
Java Island and regions outside Java Island has always been an issue and has provoked 
disintegration threats. Therefore, many experts have the opinion that there should be a 
special treatment for the development of Eastern Indonesia. Although the population is 
relatively small, the diversity of Eastern Indonesia is far more varied compared to that 
of Java Island. Considering the diverse circumstances in Eastern Indonesia, the regional 
development approach should take into account the specific local dimensions including 
the local culture and traditions. 
 From the beginning of the era of decentralization and regional autonomy, the 
regional government in Eastern Indonesia was also expected to improve their capacity 
in providing public service and in executing their authority or managing their affairs in 
the same manner as other autonomous regions outside the Eastern Region. The special 
treatment on Eastern Indonesia - within the context of regional development policy - is 
difficult to be implemented since the government was neither able to administer nor 
envision the future of Eastern Indonesia without local initiatives from its stakeholders.  
Consolidating the initiatives - by establishment of the Eastern Indonesia Development 
Council in 1993 as an example - is quite challenging to do so at this time. 
 Hence, after executing decentralization and regional autonomy, we need to monitor 
whether the regional development initiatives by stakeholders in Eastern Indonesia have 
changed or not. Are they still waiting for the external particular attention from the 
central government? Have decentralization and local-head elections given a positive or 
negative impact in the regional development of Eastern Indonesia? These issues will be 
the focus of this study. 
 In this chapter, the author discusses the correlation between regional development 
policies, decentralization, regional autonomy, and the local-head elections by observing 
several phenomena happened in the Eastern Indonesia for this study. 
 The first part of this chapter includes the regional development policy from a 
historical perspective particularly the pre- and post-New Order regime and the transition 
to the reformation era. Following that, the author will discuss the relationship between 
decentralization and the local-head elections. Finally, the author finds that the current 
situation is a democratic paradox even though the local-head election is currently 
regarded as a goal in the process of democratization. 
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2. BASIC FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1. Changes in the Indonesian Government System 
 
The drastic change in the Indonesian government system is seen in Figure 1. Less than 
ten years ago, Indonesia had been recognized as an authoritarian country under the 
Soeharto administration.  After the fall of the New Order Regime under Soeharto, the 
process of democratization began to evolve. The main objective of the change in the 
system was to lessen the power of the executive institution - in which includes the 
presidential institution - by strengthening the legislative institution to strictly control the 
executive institution during 1998-2004. 
In the first phase of this transformation, the role of the legislative has become very 
powerful with its rights and authority including the power to impeach the president 
meanwhile in contrast the president’s authority had been relatively reduced. However, 
this type of democratization, which is based on political parties, has its weaknesses. 
Most of the political parties in Indonesia were established as organizations seeking 
political power rather than becoming political players. The concentration of power in 
the legislative - in which most of its members are more oriented towards the interest of 
their political parties - encourages the legislative to take advantage of the power 
bestowed to them to repress the president for various reasons. Ultimately, the desired 
balance between the executive and the legislative as stipulated in the 1945 Constitution 
could not be achieved since the political elite are too busy with attaining political power 
but neglecting the people’s need in rehabilitating post socio-economic crisis. 
 
Figure 1. Transformation of the Indonesian Government 
 
 Soeharto 
Administration 
Habibie, Wahid, 
Megawati 
Administration 
Yudhoyono 
Administration 
Period 1966-1998 1998-2004 2004- 
Government System  Authoritarian Parliamentarian Presidential a la US 
Development Basis National Policy Guidelines (GBHN) Vision/Mission of 
President 
Sovereignty 
/Presidential Election 
People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) 
Voting by the members of MPR 
Direct Elections by the 
people 
Legislative, Executive, 
Judicative 
Inseparable from the 
holder of the power 
Legalization of the 
Division of Power 
Division of the three 
components 
Defense/Security Dual Function; Police 
in the Military 
Legal Division of the 
Military and Police 
Military (Defense), 
Police (Security) 
Source: Author 
 
Under the difficulty to establish healthy democratization process, the idea to hold a 
direct presidential and vice-presidential election became stronger. Through the 
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deliberation of the amendment on the 1945 Constitution, finally Indonesia implemented 
a direct elections system to vote for a president and a vice-president with the hope to 
establish a balance between the executive and the legislative. This presidential system is 
similar to the system in the United States in voting for the president and vice- president. 
 With this change, the National Policy Guidelines (GBHN) as the basis for the 
direction of the national development was abandoned and replaced by the vision and 
mission of the elected president as conveyed in the pre-elections campaign. Formerly, 
the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), being the legislative institution that holds 
the highest sovereignty, determined the GBHN. Meanwhile the vision and mission of 
the president is based on the ideas from the candidate’s campaign team. Even if the 
House of Representatives (DPR) still has power to impeach the president, the Law No. 
32/2004 restricts impeachment and be virtually impossible. Hence, political stability is 
ensured for a term of 5 years, if the relationship between the executive and legislative is 
almost parallel. 
 The transformation of the government system is also happening in the regional level. 
The parliamentary system was applied in the regional level based on Law No. 22/1999 
and the local-head were responsible to the local parliament at that time. However, upon 
the implementation of Law No. 32/2004, the local-head at last could not be impeached 
by the local parliament and a parallel relationship between the executive and the 
legislative was established. 
 
2.2. Changes in the Process of Development Planning 
 
Since the GBHN was replaced by the President’s vision/mission, the process of 
development planning also changed (Figure 2, 3, 4).  Prior to 2001, the development 
planning was derived from the GBHN and elaborated into the Five-Year National 
Development Plan (Repelita), the Five-Year Provincial Development Plan 
(Repelitada-I),  the Five-Year District/Municipality Development Plan (Repelitada-II), 
which was passed down vertically from the central government to the local government. 
Since the regional development plan closely connected to the national development plan, 
uniformity in format and content was apparent in the regional planning. 
In the beginning of the reformation era, the process of the regional development 
planning was adjusted by using the New Public Management (NPM) approach that was 
employed in the US as a strategic management tool3. This NPM approach applied in 
several countries was able to improve the performance and efficiency of the government. 
                                                   
3 The NPM prioritizes the vision/mission of the organization and this is elaborated in details in the 
strategies to achieve the vision/mission. These strategies are then translated into programs that are 
implemented into real projects. Apparently, the outcome of the NPM in Indonesia is slightly different 
from the original NPM although the directions and the concept are almost similar. In NPM, the 
performance evaluation is very crucial, and the budget system should be attributed to the performance 
evaluation. Indonesia has already applied the performance-based budgeting system.  
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Nowadays the top management is stimulated by the NPM method. 
 
Figure 2. Development Planning Process (prior to 2001) 
 
 
     Source: Author. 
 
 
Figure 2. Development Planning Process (2001-2004) 
 
 
Source: Author. 
 
In Figure 3, the GBHN no longer takes total control of the regional development 
planning process. In this new process, the regions are allowed to take part in dealing 
with the uniqueness and the characteristic of each region, which the central government 
could not do in detail. The concept of the unity of the nation is still upheld in the 
Regional Base Pattern that is positioned within the framework of the GBHN. The 
GBHN 
Propenas 
Renstra Renstra 
Renstra 
Repetada Repetada 
Repeta 
Prov. Basic 
Principle 
Dist./Munic. 
Basic Principle 
Dist./Munic. 
Propeda 
Provincial 
Propeda 
GBHN 
Prov. Basic Principle 
Repelita 
Dist./Munic.Basic Pronciple 
Repelitada-I 
Repelitada-II 
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GBHN is then elaborated in the National Development Program (Propenas)4, Strategic 
Plan (Renstra) and the Annual Development Plan (Repeta). 
 
Figure 4. Development Planning Process (2004 - ) 
 
 
RPJPN: National Long-term Development Plan 
RPJPD: Regional Long-term Development Plan  
RPJMN: National Medium-term Development Plan 
RPJMD: Regional Medium-term Development Plan 
RKP: Annual Government Working Plan, RKPD: Annual Local Government Working Plan 
Source: Author. 
 
 The planning process drastically changed in 2004 based on Law No. 25/2004 on 
Development Planning System. The GBHN - that had been the development guideline - 
was no longer used. As a substitute, the vision/mission of the elected president 
automatically became the vision/mission of the national development, although this is 
not literally mentioned. Since the people directly voted for the president/vice-president, 
then the vision/mission of the elected president are assumed to be highly legitimized by 
                                                   
4 In 2001-2004, the government used the term “program” instead of “plan”. This is due to the inflexibility 
of the development plan under the New Order Regime in which at that time all figures must be in detail 
and strictly abided. The monetary crisis that changed all economic assumptions has provided valuable 
lessons learned in the process of development planning and the word “plan” was avoided. However, the 
programs written in “Propenas” may be too abstract. Therefore, the evaluation on the government’s 
performance became a difficult task. Under Yudhoyono’s administration, abstract programs were 
eliminated and the term “plan” was used again with various economic targets and concrete figures. 
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RPJPD 
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RPJPD 
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RKPD 
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RKP 
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of Bupati/Mayor 
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Dist./Munic. 
RKPD 
 
Dist./Munic. 
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the people. However, in reality the vision/mission have not been discussed extensively 
amongst various stakeholders and were only drafted by the campaign team of the 
elected president and vice-president. 
Based on this vision/mission, the National Medium-term Development Plan 
(RPJMN) for a period of five years is determined and this is elaborated in the Strategic 
Plan (Renstra) and the Annual Government Working Plan (RKP). These processes 
follow the NPM (New Public Management) method. In addition to the RPJMN, the 
government must also draft the National Long-term Development Plan (RPJPN). 
 The Provinces and the Districts/Cities follow the same framework ever since the 
application of the local-head elections in 2005. The Regional Basic Principle is replaced 
by the vision/mission of the elected local-head. The same logic applies as in the central 
government process. The vision/mission that was drafted by the campaign team of the 
local-head candidate becomes the benchmark in the regional development policy. 
 
2.3. Several Questions 
 
In observing the progress of the system change, many people have shown appreciation 
towards the democratization process in Indonesia. In fact, donor agencies have 
envisioned the democratization process in Indonesia since the 1990s and they have 
offered many proposals to the Indonesian government. Nevertheless, as an observer 
residing in Makassar, a city in the Eastern Indonesia, the author does not see the process 
of democratization as the best and most appropriate system to be applied in Indonesia 
and there are several questions to be addressed. 
   Firstly, is the democratization with presidential system the most suitable for 
Indonesia? The presidential system applies a top management system and the NPM is 
viewed as a process in the development planning. In the globalization era, a quick and 
firm decision from the top management is necessary to allow the company to survive. 
This is a common trend all over the world including in the developed and 
under-developed countries. However, the effectiveness of the system greatly depends on 
the capacity of the top manager and the capacity of the organization that delegates the 
authority to the employees under mutual trust. If this is not the case, the top manager 
may become a dictator. This means that it is possible to have a presidential system that 
creates an authoritarian system, which should be abolished in the name of 
democratization. The principle of mutual consensus that is apparent in the society at 
large seems to be inconsistent with such system5. 
 Secondly, is there sufficient research on the actual degree of acceptance (from the 
people) towards the change of government system particularly in Eastern Indonesia? 
                                                   
5 In fact, there is another question i.e. whether the mutual consensus based on deliberation (musyawarah 
mufakat) - which is unique to Indonesia’s democracy - is still functioning well? Sometimes the mutual 
deliberation method mobilizes peoples on implementing development projects.  
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The democratization process in Indonesia apparently is “democratization from the top”.  
As written in history, “democracy” and “civil society” in western countries had not 
emerged from those power holders nor from the political elites but from the needs of the 
public/society. However, in fact, in Indonesia, the government did not emerge from the 
needs of the people. Therefore, the gap between the government and the people is still 
distant.6 The government has functions to guide, control, and mobilizes the people. The 
society itself has its own rules adapted to the local character of the people. In other 
words, it seems that it will be a long learning process, before the people can learn to 
combine or articulate democratization from abroad with the indigenous ‘democratic’ 
system from the people. Another factor is the feudalistic or paternalistic culture in some 
parts of the region that is still strong. Local peoples do not always accepted 
democratization as expected by external sources. Sometimes democratization may 
paradoxically strengthen the feudalistic and paternalistic practices. 
 Thirdly, is the political party-based democratization appropriate for the current 
condition of the regions? The Indonesian society has long been kept remote from 
politics during the New Order Regime and has not been able to take advantage of the 
political institutions for the interest of the people. Most of the political parties, 
established during less than these 10 years, are still busy in expanding their existence. 
The organizational structure of the political parties is still centralistic and the parties’ 
concern towards regional development is minimal. The democratization in Indonesia is 
based on centralistic political parties; meanwhile the government system runs on 
decentralization and regional autonomy. From the point of view of development 
implementation, the political parties do not function as an intermediary between the 
regional government and the people. Conflict between interests of the region/people 
with the interest of the political parties often takes place in the local level.  Having 
these questions in mind, this chapter will discuss the basic outline of the 
inter-relationship between democratization, decentralization and regional autonomy, and 
local-head elections, particularly in Eastern Indonesia, as well as identifying the issues 
to be addressed and several recommendations that will be discussed further within the 
government and within the intellectual circle in Indonesia. 
 
 
3. DEVELOPMENT POLICY OF EASTERN INDONESIA 
 
The term “Kawasan Timur Indonesia” (KTI), or Eastern Region of Indonesia, just 
emerged in the beginning of the 1990s, and triggered a solidarity within the 13 
                                                   
6 The meaning of the word ‘government’ in Indonesian language is considered different from the 
meaning in English. The tone of the word ‘government’ may be inferred as “the instructor giving orders” 
which may affect the people’s image on the government. This should be taken into account when 
reducing the distant gap between the government and the people. 
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Provinces (at that time) in KTI under the Eastern Indonesia Development Council 
(DP-KTI) in 1993. This solidarity was never before apparent7. Eastern Indonesia 
identifies itself as a backward region or not-advanced area. Therefore, these regions 
demand special attention and special treatment from the central government in terms of 
the regional development strategy.8  
 Nowadays, the term KTI is not as popular as it used to be, particularly under the 
current administration led by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Under his 
administration, the post of the State Minister for the Development of Eastern Indonesia 
has been changed to the State Minister for the Acceleration of Development on 
Backward Regions since October 20049. 
 
3.1. Before the 1990s: Regional Development under the Government 
 
During the New Order era, the regional development policy did not regard regional 
issues as an importance. The government prioritized economic growth and expected that 
the development outcome would create a trickle-down affect in the regions. In the 
centralistic system, the income distribution from the central government to the regions 
was regulated by the Government in the form of subsidies under various Presidential 
Instructions/Decrees. Most of the flow of the development funds is from the central 
government to the regions. 
 The rich natural resources of Indonesia are not proportional to the size of the 
population. In the densely populated island of Java, the natural resources are limited.  
In areas outside the Java Island including Eastern Indonesia, it is the opposite – the 
natural resources are abundant. In general, the aim of development is to enhance the 
individual’s welfare measured by Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP) per capita. 
Hence, the Government paid more attention to the people’s welfare in the highly 
populated areas of Java Island rather than the other areas outside Java. The rich natural 
resources available outside Java Island had been utilized to achieve the overall goal of 
the Government, i.e. to enhance the prosperity of the people on a national scale. This 
would mean that the natural resources were mostly used for the people in Java Island. 
                                                   
7 The Dutch colonial government once stipulated Gouvernement Groote Oost that includes the regions of 
Bali, Sulawesi, Maluku, Nusa Tenggara (except East Timor) and Papua in 1938. After the declaration of 
independence in 1945, the Dutch tried to recolonize Indonesia by establishing the State of East Indonesia 
(NIT) that includes Bali, Sulawesi, Maluku, and Nusa Tenggara (except East Timor) in 1947 and then 
became the United States of Republic of Indonesia (1949-1950). However, these efforts were carried out 
by the Government for a political goal and were not derived from the local people of Eastern Indonesia at 
that time. 
8 Not all regions in Eastern Indonesia are backward. However, the backwardness image can be easily 
employed for the interest of the politicians. 
9 The reason for this change is that some regions in Western Indonesia are also categorized as backward 
areas. This is a reflection of the political interest, but it does not necessarily mean that the attention to 
Eastern Indonesia has been trimmed down. 
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Using military power, and for the sake of the country’s defense under the Unitary State 
of Indonesia, the government at that time was able to suppress the grievances from the 
people outside Java Island who may have felt being unfairly exploited by the Javanese. 
 In the National Spatial Plan, the large industries exploiting natural resources were 
built outside Java, for example, the oil and gas industries, and fertilizer plants in Aceh, 
South Sumatra and East Kalimantan. Foreign investment companies set up mining 
businesses, such as gold in Papua, nickels in Sulawesi and coals in South Sumatra and 
East Kalimantan. However, these huge industries are more capital intensive rather than 
labor intensive, providing only insignificant impact on the local economic development. 
For technical and operational reasons, many workers from Java were brought in to work 
in these industries and this was considered as a process of “javanization” of Aceh and 
Papua.  
 
3.2. 1990-1998: Look East with the Eastern Indonesia Development Council 
 
Before the 1990s, the concept of area approach in regional development was not yet 
popular, even though in spatial planning there was a division of areas. In January 1990, 
President Soeharto in his speech addressed the issue on the necessity to direct the 
development towards an eastern outlook by “looking east”, which means the Eastern 
Part of Indonesia (IBT)10. Under Soeharto’s directives, the attention towards IBT 
surfaced in discussion forums led by economists, specifically, members of PERHEPI, an 
association for agricultural economist.11. 
 Before the impact of Soeharto’s speech, Indonesia was experiencing a quite high 
economic growth and enjoying a positive export and import balance along with a 
smooth flow of investment.  Unfortunately, this led to a social gap between the rich 
and the poor, worsened by the social sentiment of pribumi (natives) vs. non-pribumi 
(non-natives), as ethnic discrimination, and the emotions between the Moslems and 
non-Moslems. One of the reasons for Soeharto’s concern on this matter is the rising 
tense within the society that may jeopardize the socio-political stability in Indonesia. 
The effort to promote economic growth aimed to reduce the negative impact of this 
unfavorable condition by focusing on the income gap in the society. 
 The discussions of the economists made the idea to have an institution to manage 
totally the development in IBT, since the regions within IBT are not economically 
                                                   
10 The term IBT or Eastern Part of Indonesia was introduced and the term East Indonesia was no longer 
used. It is most likely that the term “East Indonesia” may remind people of the so-called “Negara 
Indonesia Timur (NIT)” or the State of East Indonesia formed in 1946 that then became part of the United 
States of Republic Indonesia (RIS) assisted by the Netherlands. 
11 CSIS (1990), Clipping Documents No. 206/E/V/1990 on “The Development of Eastern Region of 
Indonesia 1990 (Volume I). PERHEPI played an important role in promoting the concept of Presidential 
Instruction (Inpres) on Backward Villages (IDT) that became a national program since 1994.  The 
Indonesian Association of Economic Graduates (ISEI) also discussed the infrastructure of IBT in 1991. 
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inter-related. An example of such institution is the Batam Authority that handles the 
development in Batam Island. Finally, under Presidential Decree No. 120/1993 on 
December 24, 1993, the Eastern Indonesia Development Council (DP-KTI) was 
established12. President Soeharto was the Head of DP-KTI, and he appointed the State 
Minister for Research and Technology B. J. Habibie as the Executive Chief and 12 other 
ministers were members of the Council. The Eastern Indonesia consists of 13 Provinces 
(at that time) including East Timor that was then part of Indonesia13. 
 Under this Council, regional development policy for Eastern Indonesia began to 
change. Bappenas started to use a categorization as the Western Region of Indonesia 
(KBI) and the Eastern Region of Indonesia (KTI) to drive the activity of DP-KTI14. 
DP-KTI applied a growth pole strategy by assigning Integrated Economic Development 
Areas (known as KAPET) in each province of the Eastern Indonesia. DP-KTI 
designated these 13 “KAPETs” under the Presidential Decree and these special regions 
have special investment treatments and tax exemptions. DP-KTI drafted the master plan 
for the respective KAPET in each province and allocated funds for the KAPET. 
 However, not all KAPETs had the capacity to develop its area. Some KAPETs were 
selected based on local political reasons. There were also some KAPETs chosen because 
of the poverty in this area that needed assistance from the central government. Since 
some of these KAPETs consist of several Districts/Cities, there was a lack of 
coordination between the local governments and it was difficult to manage the 
overlapping government administration. By the end of the day, most of these KAPETs 
were unable to perform and only became “pseudo” institutions. In the reformation era, 
the management of the KAPETs was handed over from the central government to the 
provincial government, but it was apparently too late to improve the management. Out 
of 13 KAPETs, only the KAPET Manado-Bitung in North Sulawesi Utara that is still 
active in attracting investors from outside the region15. 
 The monetary crisis in 1997-1998 had a very negative impact on most of the 
KAPETs and on the activities of DP-KTI. Physical development such as the 
development of the riverbanks of Mamberamo in Papua could not be continued due to 
the financial constraint of Indonesia at that time which would not make it possible to 
run huge and ambitious projects. DP-KTI, which focuses on physical development and 
fast growth, could not function as expected. Eventually, DP-KTI changed its function 
from the executor to the coordinator. 
                                                   
12 The term “Authority” was not suitable because DP-KTI had to pull together 13 Provinces. 
13 Four Provinces in Kalimantan were also included in the category of KTI. KTI consists of all areas of 
Indonesia except Sumatra, Java and Bali. 
14 The Secretary of DP-KTI is the Fifth Deputy for Regional Development Affairs in Bappenas at that 
time. 
15 The KAPET in Central Kalimantan, namely the KAPET One Million Hectares has long been inactive, 
but the government now has revitalized it although it is unclear whether this is a revitalization of the 
former KAPET or is it just a project area for a big-scale rice plantation program. 
 13 
 
3.3. Post New Order: Era of Local Initiatives with Confusion 
 
The transition from the New Order era to the Post New Order era (Reformation era) 
brought in change in the development policy. To clear out the centralistic mode of the 
New Order administration, President B. J. Habibie supported the acceleration of the 
decentralization and regional autonomy process. Upon the passing of the Law No. 
22/1999 and Law No. 25/1999, a big portion of the authority was delegated from the 
central government to the regional government particularly to the Districts/Cities. In 
other words, the main executor in regional development policy was handed over to the 
District/Municipality government under the coordination of the Provincial government 
and was no longer under the central government. 
 Within the context of regional development policy, the regional government has the 
rights to take initiatives in developing their region. This means the era for local 
initiatives. Nevertheless, for 30 long years, the regional government has been 
accustomed to receiving orders and directives from the central government. Therefore, 
it would be quite difficult to expect local initiatives from them. In fact, the local 
government in Eastern Indonesia had to face a lot of confusion in executing the 
decentralization and regional autonomy in practice. 
 Before they could come up with local initiatives, Eastern Indonesia needed to 
recover from the economic downturn and had to overcome the deterioration of the 
people’s welfare condition in the region. The policy to accelerate economic growth as 
desired under DP-KTI could not be applied, since the focus of the policy was to poverty 
alleviation. 
 In reality, the impact of the monetary crisis in Eastern Indonesia was not as bad as in 
Java because the Eastern Region has relative high portion of export commodities such 
as cacao, coffee and fresh fish in regional economies. However, according to the 
statistics, the ratio of poor people in Eastern Indonesia is relatively high and these 
people are the target groups for poverty alleviation programs from the government and 
international donors. 
 In line with the policy on poverty alleviation, IDT was implemented in 1994-1996. 
Backward villages were identified and all villages in the Provinces of Maluku and Irian 
Jaya (now known as Papua) were selected as targets for the IDT Program even though 
not all these villages were under the category of backward villages. During the 
monetary crisis, the central government provided a Social Safety Net (JPS) program and 
introduced it throughout Eastern Indonesia in the form of “food for work” by opening 
job opportunities, scholarships for poor students, supplying generic medicines and so 
forth. 
 With the atmosphere of decentralization and regional autonomy, four provinces in 
Sulawesi (at that time) singed a regional cooperation agreement with MOUs by the four 
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governors in September 2000 in Makassar. This cooperative spirit was spreading out to 
Kalimantan, Sumatra and Java-Bali. Apparently, this momentum prompted competition 
among the regional government to attract investment, to upgrade public service and 
improve public financial management. However, up to now, this trend of competing for 
good governance has not become a mass movement16. 
 Among the effort to implement development policy in the regions, there were 
numerous incidents of disruptions causing instability. For example, since 1999, 
horizontal conflicts had occurred in Ambon and in several areas in Maluku and North 
Maluku, in Poso and other areas in Central and South Sulawesi. MOU - initiated by the 
four governors of Sulawesi - was signed to address the issue of refugees from Poso 
seeking refuge in all provinces in Sulawesi. Due to this on-going conflict, the social and 
economic growth was slow, stagnant or even declined drastically. 
 Another disturbing factor that affected the regional development policy is the boom 
in the division of areas (pemekaran wilayah) that is in line with the implementation of 
the regional autonomy. In many cases, the issues on pemekaran have upset the 
socio-economic activity of the region. Tension within the society heightened due to the 
conflict of interest of the local political elite. 
 In Eastern Indonesia, the Papua Province received special treatment from the central 
government under the Special Autonomy Law (Law No. 21/2001) in which division of 
areas (pemekaran) was also stipulated and this resulted in the establishment of a new 
province of West Irian Jaya in 200217. Disputes and questions on the inconsistency of 
the law and ordinance regarding pemekaran emerged in the society. Despite the 
unsettled adjustments of this inconsistency, pemekaran in the Districts/Cities of Papua 
continued.  Although Papua enjoyed special autonomy, the regional development 
policy in the provincial level and the District/Municipality level did not seem to run 
smoothly. The allocation of special autonomy funds also created new problems in terms 
of efficient expenditure and spending on development18. 
 
 
 
                                                   
16 From an outer perspective, the competition is more of a rivalry in gaining development funds from the 
central government and donors, or in increasing regional original revenues (PAD) through various 
policies. 
17 The Province of West Irian Jaya (now West Papua) was established based on Law No. 45/1999 and 
was emphasized by Inpres No. 1/2003. However, this realized without the deliberation and consent from 
various stakeholders in Papua in discussing the inconsistency of Law No. 45/1999, Inpres No. 1/2003, 
and Law No. 21/2001. Most intellectuals in Papua argue that this is an ignorance from the Government. 
The Constitutional Court vaguely ruled that the establishment of the West Irian Jaya Province must be 
accepted as a fact although it is unconstitutional. Law No. 45/1999 also stipulated the establishment of 
Central Irian Jaya, but it was then frozen due to strong public rejection.      
18 The Provincial Government Expenditures in Papua and West Irian Jaya was analyzed in detail by 
SofEI (2005), Analysis on Public Expenditures in Papua. 
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4. DECENTRALIZATION AND LOCAL-HEAD ELECTIONS 
 
4.1. Decentralization and Democratization in the Regions 
 
In the history of decentralization, there are two types of decentralization within the 
context of developing countries, i.e. decentralization to enhance efficiency on fiscal 
policy and decentralization as one form of democratization. 
 In many developing countries, centralistic development often results in monetary 
and fiscal crisis, burdening foreign debt and inefficient public sector. To improve 
efficiency, the central government needs to allocate the fiscal burden to the regional 
government by giving authority to handle their own financial management. This is in 
accordance with the recommendation from the World Bank and IMF to promote 
structural adjustment and privatization of the public sector. Obviously, the provision and 
management of local public goods would be more efficient - in terms of fund allocation 
– if the local government realizes, since the local government has better understanding 
of the needs of the region compared to the central government19. 
 Meanwhile, the development administration in many developing countries applies a 
centralistic and authoritarian system. The idea of “development first, democracy later” 
or known as “developmentalism” or “development dictatorship” was justified 
internationally during the Cold War20. Nonetheless, after the Cold War in the beginning 
of the 1990s, international donors started to provide foreign aid for democratization as a 
priority to aim for good governance and civil society21 . Decentralization is also 
discussed in the context of democratization. The discussion on decentralization related 
to democratization was evident since the mid 1990s among the international donors. 
 These two understandings on decentralization certainly have affected the 
                                                   
19 In Public Economics, the government (public) sector has three roles (in the context of economics), i.e. 
(1) income distribution, (2) economic stability, and (3) resource allocation (Oates [1972]). The first and 
second roles are considered more appropriate if handled by the central government in a unitary system. 
Meanwhile the third role is more suitable if managed by the regional government. The combination of the 
three roles is known as “financial federalism” (different from the “political federalism” and is not related 
to the form of the state). In Indonesia, the study of economics and the financial system basically follows 
this school of thought. 
20 The authoritarian regime (such as the New Order Regime in Indonesia, in Malaysia or in Singapore) in 
which political rights are restricted, ensures socio-political stability by using the power of the military and 
the police so that the socio-political factors do not interfere the economic activities. The regime makes 
sure that all development programs driven by the government should run smoothly in the early phase of 
economic development. Nonetheless, economic development itself brings about the need for democracy 
and therefore adjustments were made by the regime. In Indonesia, this happened drastically in 1998. 
21 This term became very popular in the government circle starting from the central government down to 
the village level and has not been translated precisely into Indonesian. “Civil society” once was translated 
as “masyarakat madani” but it was not widely accepted due to the debate on the meaning. These terms are 
quite abstract (vague) and should be translated to reflect the activities in the fields. Moreover, this term 
should actually be derived from the Indonesian society, but this term was accepted as if it was from 
abroad, particularly from the West. However, the historical process of forming the civil society in the 
West and in Indonesia is significantly different. 
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transformation process of the centralistic system to a decentralized system in Indonesia 
since 1998. The urge to change not only came from the international donors, but also 
from the Indonesian people themselves who wanted to rid the remnants of the Soeharto 
administration. The terms ‘good governance’ and ‘civil society’ immediately became 
popular even in the village levels, as if these were new ideas from abroad. However, the 
correlation of these concepts with the reality is minimal22. 
 The process of democratization in Indonesia started from the change in government 
institutions and systems including several amendments of the 1945 Constitution 
following the reformation era. After numerous trials and errors in implementing a new 
system for the legislative, executive and judicative, both tryouts on the parliamentary 
system and the presidential system, finally Indonesia decided to run direct elections. 
The president and vice president are directly elected by the people and no longer were 
elected by the legislative since 200423. Compared to the electoral system of the New 
Order period that sustained until 1998, the transformation process of the presidential 
elections is considered very drastic in the context of democratization. Furthermore, the 
change in the system of the local-head elections soon followed pursuit in the 2005. With 
the system of direct elections, the process of democratization in Indonesia seemed to 
have reached the desired goal of reformation. 
 Nevertheless, democratization is not sufficient only by the existence of such system 
and institutions. The new system and institution can only function if the players 
understand the aim and philosophy of the process and the core of democratization. The 
agents must also have the capacity to execute activities that promote the appropriate 
democratization for Indonesia. In the regional areas where the government apparatus 
have been accustomed to the authoritarian system for more than 30 years, it would 
certainly be difficult to have a change in the system unless they totally change their 
attitude and mindset.  Besides that, decentralization may induce the re-awakening of 
regional sentiment phenomena that is based on ethnicity, religion, race and exclusivism. 
The political influences now entered the villages and kampongs, and the political 
implications on all aspects of life are unavoidable. 
 
4.2. Local-Head Elections in Decentralization: Positive or Negative? 
 
Have the local-head direct elections given a positive or negative impact towards 
                                                   
22 Hidayat (2007) through his interviews found out that local government apparatus had very limited 
understanding of democratization and regional autonomy. 
23 The direct elections involving the people’s participation to vote for the President and Vice President 
mean that Indonesia decided to use the presidential system ‘ala USA instead of applying other systems 
used in European countries and in Japan. This system was also applied in the regional level to run the 
local-head elections. The parliamentary system ‘ala Indonesia was drastically changed to the presidential 
system similar to the one used in USA. For this reason, the change of the political system in Indonesia is 
considered very radical. 
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regional development? Based on several current examples and experience in Indonesia, 
apparently both effects are visible. 
 Under the new system of local-head elections, the people have the right to determine 
the future of their region by directly electing a local-head. The people will not vote for a 
candidate that they assume to be incapable of developing their region. In other words, 
through the system of local-head elections, the people must participate in the process of 
regional development by choosing their representative to become the local-head that is 
capable to execute the development policy. Therefore, if the local-head is deemed 
unable to implement the regional development or in fact is a liability for the region, the 
people can protest and can impeach him/her. The people should also feel responsible 
since they voted for the local-head. The local-head election is not a beauty contest. The 
local-head elections should have positive implications. However, if the people as the 
voters and the local-head as the elected are irresponsible then the positive effect - in the 
name of democratization- could not be achieved. 
 Currently, the regions in Indonesia are still in the learning process of understanding 
the meaning and the essence of the system of local-head elections. The people are still 
trapped in the atmosphere of the general elections of the New Order era, and presume 
that they are instructed to follow the government program. They consider themselves as 
spectators of a political drama in their region. This is because the people have not been 
given many opportunities to search for their own representative that is not necessarily 
affiliated to a political party.24. In general, most people have the opinion that the 
candidate for the local-head is assigned from the top or from outside the region. They do 
not have the notion that the local-head election is directly related to their daily life. The 
position of the local-head candidate is deemed distant from the people. 
 The political elite can take advantage of the people in this transitional phase of 
learning democratization by building political base groups. These political elite seize the 
power because they do not apply democratic methods and are not accountable for the 
people. Since laws and regulations still explicitly allow candidates only from political 
parties, the motivation to gain a position of the local-head is driven by the needs of the 
political party. Yet, the political parties in the regions are pre-occupied in reaffirming 
their existence and seeking constituents to support them. Meanwhile, these political 
parties have not given any attention to the local regional development strategy nor the 
policy. 
 To gain power after the local-head elections, the political elite often take advantage 
                                                   
24 The Constitutional Court (MK) on 23 July 2007 allowed independent candidates unattached to any 
political party in future local-head elections. In the province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD), 
Local-head elections resulted in electing a governor and vice governor from independent candidates in 
December 2006. This fact in NAD may have influenced the ruling of the Constitutional Court. However, 
the MK’s ruling needed to be further processed by stipulating the implementation regulations. Many 
local-head elections in 2007 including the governor elections for Jakarta and South Sulawesi did not 
allow independent candidates. 
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of the paternalistic and feudal environment that is still alive especially in Eastern 
Indonesia. They will use local symbols, traditions, custom laws, and cultural values or 
practically anything for the sake of their goal without really paying attention to the 
meaning of these values. Decentralization and regional autonomy often promotes 
culture, local wisdom or customs and these are also taken as an opportunity to establish 
cultural and traditional institutions. This may give the impression that the political elite 
are protecting or preserving the local culture, but often times it is merely for certain 
political goals. The misuse of local culture and wisdom as a political tool or goal are 
often seriously observed. It is almost impossible to free all the factors in the region from 
political intrusion after the local-head elections. 
  Currently, the local-head elections seem to disrupt the process of decentralization 
that should have delegated the authority from the Provinces or from the Districts/Cities 
to the villages and the local people. At the national level, the process of decentralization 
is handed over from the central government to the region. However, on contrary, the 
local government in the provincial level or the district/municipality level exploits the 
decentralization system to operate a local centralistic system, without any continued 
process of decentralization towards reaching the people. 
 This phenomenon, often known as “Mini-Soeharto”, is evident in the process of 
decentralization, and the local-head elections underline this phenomenon. Most of the 
elected local-heads presume that they have strong legitimacy from the people and they 
can become “king” of their region. The maximum term of duty of a local-head is 10 
years (elected twice) and therefore the local-head will try to make the most of his tenure  
by gaining as much power within the limited time of two “terms of duty”. 
 
 
5. DEMOCRATIZATION PARADOX 
 
5.1. ‘Government Autonomy’ and ‘Citizen Autonomy’ 
 
Regional autonomy should mean “autonomy that is owned by the region” as a whole. In 
the region, there is the government, the private sector, and the community and all these 
stakeholders create an autonomous environment collectively. Regional autonomy is a 
collective concept that was initiated by the regions.  
As an example, under the Japanese Constitution, regional autonomy consists of two 
types of autonomy: “government autonomy” and “citizen autonomy”. “Government 
autonomy” means that the autonomy is derived from the local authority including the 
local government. The local government handles the administration of the regional 
development under the government’s initiatives and responsibility. Meanwhile, “citizen 
autonomy” entails public administration and service of the local government based on 
the initiatives and the needs of the local people. This means that the people’s 
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sovereignty is a ‘citizen-based autonomy’. In Japan, the peoples have the right to 
petition directly to the local government, as follows: (1) the right to appeal for the 
establishment or abolishment of a local ordinance (submitted to the local-head); (2) the 
right to call for a referendum (submitted to the local parliament); (3) the right to 
investigate the budget expenditures (submitted to the auditor); and (4) the right to recall 
the local-head or the members of the parliament (submitted to the Regional Commission 
for General Elections). To file the petition, the number of petitioners (shown by 
signatures) must meet a certain ratio of the population25. 
 In Indonesia, although this concept is not apparent, there is a term known as otonomi 
asli (original autonomy) in the context of village autonomy. Otonomi asli, that is 
characterized by the locality and diversity of the village,26 does not necessarily focus on 
the people’s initiatives in general and it is separated from the context of regional 
autonomy as a whole. As in the New Order era, if the regional development policy is 
carried out without taking into account the people’s initiatives, then it is most likely that 
only ‘local government autonomy’ that is functioning. Meanwhile, the autonomy based 
on peoples’ initiatives may not be functioning, as it should be. Democratization in the 
regional level should work under an interaction between the ‘local government 
autonomy’ and the ‘citizen autonomy’. 
 The legal framework on regional autonomy to this extent is more focused on 
‘government autonomy, i.e. ‘local government autonomy’. Whereas, ‘citizen autonomy’ 
has yet to receive a support system that provides control on the local government (by 
the peoples). 
 
5.2. Communication between Local Government and Peoples 
 
It is true that a legal framework has not supported ‘citizen autonomy’, but the 
communication between the local government and the peoples needs to be nurtured on a 
daily basis. In reality, the communication between the two sides is not as ideal as it is 
supposed to be. 
 Historically from the colonial times, in general, the function of the government in 
Indonesia was controlling and regulating the peoples rather than providing public 
services. The Government was always on guard for the possibility of any rebellious 
incidence against the government. The Dutch colonial government applied so-called 
divide-and-rule approach and induced disintegration of the people so that the peoples 
were divided based on religion, ethnicity, and race. Furthermore, the government 
                                                   
25 For example, the petition to establish/abolish a regulation requires signatures from 1/50 of the voters in 
the districts/cities. 
26 The term otonomi asli is used in the Explanation Notes of Law No. 22/1999 and Law No. 32/2004 in 
the category of village autonomy. The concept of otonomi asli in Indonesia needs to be further explored 
for example by comparing it with the concept of ‘citizen autonomy’ as in Japan, since it is closely related 
to communication issues between the government and the peoples as discussed in this chapter. 
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encouraged conflict between the peoples. The approach that the government used 
towards the peoples is by mass mobilization instead of facilitating the people27. In 
principle, even after independence, the Indonesian government apparently followed 
pursuit in managing the country by using a similar approach from the colonial times, 
since probably there was no available alternative model at that time except the colonial 
model. Therefore, up to now, this type of approach is still dominant in the government 
in which the government seems to always control and regulate the people 28 .  
Apparently, the local government is not yet ready to provide ideal public service to the 
people. 
 On the other hand, the peoples do not also quite appreciate the existence of the state 
or government in their daily lives. All this while, the people have managed their 
community by themselves for their own interest. The rules they apply are a consensus 
among members. In the case that the government apparatus approaches them, the people 
would think that this is for the interest of the government. Sometimes the people may 
feel bothered but are afraid of being reprimanded by the government if they do not show 
their support or loyalty to the government. Usually the people would try to adjust to 
what government wants. Therefore, the people do not quite see the role of the 
government in their daily lives except for dealing with the issuance of ID cards, 
business license and other administrative matters. Furthermore, since the function of the 
government tends to be regulating and controlling the people, then the people tend to be 
passive and comply with the directives from the government. Ultimately, the people 
choose to wait and become submissive towards the regional development policy instead 
of conveying their wishes and hopes based on their own initiatives. When there is no 
room for communication between the government and the peoples, and the people can 
no longer bear their grievances, they may run amuck and often rally destructive 
demonstrations. The government often counters such brutal action from the 
demonstrators with violence. 
 The term ‘participation’ may come from the initiatives of the participants. However, 
in Indonesia, the government often requires ‘participation’ to the people with frequently 
saying “thank you for your participation”. Therefore, this type of ‘participation’ 
facilitated by the government is almost similar to ‘mobilization of people’. In the 
democratization process, the term ‘participatory approach’ also became popular along 
                                                   
27 The terms ‘facilitation’ or fasilitasi in Indonesian has become very popular amongst the government 
officials along with the term ‘accountability’, ‘good governance’ and ‘civil society’. They would say the 
local government must ‘facilitate’ instead of ‘regulate’. However, the local government apparatus 
assumed that the capacity to ‘facilitate’ could be easily done through training. They understand the idea 
that the officials are facilitators, but they do not seem to be aware of the concept of institutional 
facilitators (such as the local government). Matsui (2005) discusses the role of facilitators as catalyst 
agents in the process of regional autonomy. 
28  Government apparatus including the regional government officials often require payment to 
compensate for their services. In fact, they are proactive in offering their services for the sake of earning 
‘service fees’. This is reflected in their understanding of service from their perspective. 
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with the terms of good governance and civil society. However, the understanding of 
‘participation’ is still influenced by the conventional concept. 
 Actually, the local-head election is a valuable opportunity to link the government and 
the peoples, unfortunately both sides distrust each other. Autonomy does not necessarily 
mean that the stakeholders have the freedom to do anything they want for their own 
interest. Instead, autonomy should be based on independent initiatives for public interest 
and should be accountable. To create ‘local government autonomy’ that is connected to 
‘citizen autonomy’, it needs to bring closer the relationship between the government and 
the peoples. ‘Local government autonomy’ without developing ‘citizen autonomy’ is 
meaningless. It is impossible to correlate ‘local government autonomy’ and ‘citizen 
autonomy’ without eliminating the distrust. Can this valuable opportunity of the 
local-head elections improve the communication between government and the people in 
the process of democratization? 
 
5.3. Local-Head Elections: Results from Democratization with Formality 
 
In the context of the democratization process in Indonesia in the post-New Order era, 
the local-head election is designated as a goal that must be reached. So far, in general, 
the local-head elections have run smoothly except for a few cases that provoked 
polemics and conflicts among the local people. This situation is quite different and 
considered reasonably progressive compared to the elections in the New Order era. It 
was always presumed that the situation around the elections during the New Order era 
would become tense, chaotic and dangerous although it was tightly managed by the 
Soeharto government. The enhanced awareness on the importance of the elections is an 
indicator of progress in the democratization process. 
 Nonetheless, as discussed in this chapter, the directions of decentralization and 
regional autonomy along with the local-head elections are not quite synchronized. The 
local-head elections - which are supposed to be a benchmark of democratization - in 
contrary have produced local-heads that tend to assume all the power for a term of 10 
years. There is also lack of attention towards the relationship between ‘local 
government autonomy’ and ‘citizen autonomy’. 
 The reason for this is that the government administration itself has adopted 
decentralization and regional autonomy, but the elected local-head is still centered on 
the political parties. The regional political party is not yet capable of conveying their 
input or recommendations in the regional development strategy. They are more 
concerned in building their support-base and financial resources within their region. The 
structure of political parties is still centralistic and the actions and strategy of the 
political party’s Regional/District/Branch Leaders Council (DPW/DPD/DPC) are totally 
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under the Central Leaders Council (DPP) in Jakarta29. 
 This is quite ironic. Decentralization and regional autonomy has changed the 
orientation of regional development policy - from following instructions and directives 
of the government to local initiatives and accountability of the local government itself. 
Meanwhile, the elected local-head is under the shadow of the political party that has a 
very centralistic structure and the political party tends to exploit the elected local-head 
for the interest of the political party without respect to the future development of the 
region. In the local-head elections, virtually there is not so much difference among the 
competing candidates in their vision/mission and the strategy for regional development. 
Therefore, once the candidate was elected, there would only be a few debates or serious 
discussions on the vision/mission and development programs. In addition to that, the 
people were also not so enthusiastic to convey their hopes to the candidates. On the 
other hand, the people may enter into a deal with the local-head to gain something from 
the candidate during the campaign. Being a prominent figure in the region is important 
for a local-head candidate and therefore a significant amount of funds is needed to 
maintain this status. 
Towards the end, the local-head elections are merely elections for local-heads using 
symbols, images and their influential figure. This phenomenon - both from the view of 
the people and the candidate - creates an election that has no formality linked to the 
aspects of regional development practice. The local-head election under this type of 
formality seems to run smoothly without any conflict or violent incidences. The 
international observers regard this as a successful process of democratization.  
 In the course of this type of democratization, the elected candidate can easily 
become a “king” with the intension to reap all the power in the local government.  
Under this trend, it often happens that the vision/mission of the elected local-head is 
inconsistent with the vision/mission offered during the pre-election campaign and there 
is no explanation of this change to the public. The local-head must formulate the 
Medium-term Regional Development Plan (RPJMD) within 3 months upon his/her 
assignment as local-head. However, this process is also often not open to the public.  
As a result, the stakeholders in the region do not have ownership of these documents, 
such as the RPJMD document determined under the Perda (regional ordinance)30. 
                                                   
29 In determining the local-head candidates in 2003, the DPW/DPD (regional) and the DPP (central) of 
the political party often come into conflict, but in general, the candidate from the DPP usually takes the 
lead. The centralistic political party is still dominant and up to now, there is no political party that applies 
the decentralization system. However, as the local-head elections progress, apparently, the influence from 
the DPP (central) in determining the candidate has become less dominant and they tend to respect the 
decision from the DPW/DPD (region). This change is seen in the selection mechanism of the local-head 
candidate in Golkar Party. 
30 The drafting the Regional Medium-term Development Plan (RPJMD) usually involves scholars from 
local universities similar to the practice in the New Order era. Therefore, the content of the plan may not 
necessarily reflect the change in the fields. Most of the District/Municipality governments do not have the 
capacity to draft their own plan (RPJMD) by themselves and this may possibly influence the tendency to 
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 From one perspective, the local-head election is a progressive application of 
democratization compared to the former method. However, in reality it has not been 
able to create a dynamic democracy within the context of regional development. The 
local-head elections were filled with political maneuvers including money politics and 
black campaign. Meanwhile, there is no serious debate on regional development and on 
the future of the region. The regional development issue has only been used as a 
competition tool to gain power among the political elite group in their region. In this 
context, the local-head election is viewed as democratization having a formality with no 
content to create democratic dynamics towards regional development.  
 
5.4. Local-Head Leadership: ‘Manager’ or ‘King’? 
 
Decentralization and regional autonomy has brought forward fair competition and 
cooperation between regions, as the case of Sulawesi. Since the local government now 
applies the presidential system and no longer uses the parliamentary system, then the 
performance of one region is dependent on the capacity of its local-head. The capacity 
of the local-head means the capacity to run or manage the government. 
In this circumstance, there are two types of leaderships arising from the local-head. 
The local-head is either the “government manager” or the “king”. The different type of 
leadership does not only originate from the character of the local-head, but also stems 
from the local subordinates’ behavior. If the government officials are still feudalistic and 
are oriented towards “pleasing the boss” (ABS), then the local-head that initially 
intended to become a “manager”, is required to play the role as the “king”.  
 A local-head as a manager needs to be supported by government officials that are 
independent, responsible and trustworthy. If not, then the local-head would be unable to 
delegate the authority to his/her subordinates. Bureaucratic inefficiency (red tape) 
becomes common in practice; For example, one would have to queue and wait for a 
document to be signed by the local-head him/herself.  A bureaucratic system that 
“depends on” the signature of the local-head would mean that this type of government, 
under the “king”, is not oriented to public service or not “service friendly”31. To 
improve the efficiency of the local government, the local-head should act as the 
manager in a company. In reality, the elected local-heads - originating from political 
parties - tend to become “kings”. In the locals-head elections, the candidates must spend 
a huge amount of money as an investment to win the elections. As a result, upon being 
elected, the local-head would first find a way to earn a payback for his/her investment. 
The supporters - including the political parties - also expect a reward or compensation 
                                                                                                                                                     
be indifferent and irresponsible towards the implementation of the plan. For the universities, the RPJMD 
document becomes an attractive project source. 
31 Such long procedure in the bureaucracy encourages signature forgery that eventually becomes a 
common practice among the government officials. 
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for their support, not only in the form of money, but also in the form of projects or by 
the recruitment of certain allies in the government institution32. The elected local-head 
may have difficulty in avoiding this. In addition to that, the partnership between the 
local-head and the legislative is also essential in rectifying various Perdas in the local 
parliamentary discussions. The members of the local parliament - coming from political 
parties - would certainly prioritize the interest of their political party or their personal 
interest. To add more burdens to the local-head, not only the legislatives demand special 
treatment, but also many institutions and civil society organizations, that have 
backed-up the candidate, expect special treatment as a reward for their support. 
Consequently, the local-head would not be able to run the government as a professional 
manager.  
    The request for special treatment or exclusive facilities does not necessarily 
correspond with the public interest and in fact, it may impede the improvement on 
public service for all levels of the community. The provisions of special treatment or 
exclusive facilities are based on family connections, private or financial donations. This 
practice is considered as natural and is taken for granted. In this type of local-head 
elections, the trend becomes more apparent compared to the former parliamentary 
system that limits the voters from the members of the local legislative body. Indeed, the 
local-head elections were carried out because in the former system, the members of the 
parliament were irrelevant and not considered as representatives of the people.  
 The conditions depicted in this chapter can be observed region-wide in Eastern 
Indonesia. From region to region, the phenomenon does not differ too much. Under 
these circumstances, can democratization - after the local-head elections - expand 
further to achieve a regional development plan that really reaches the public in general?  
How can a local-head change from being a “king” to being a “manager”? 
 One of the possible solutions depends on the capability of the central and the 
provincial government to encourage fair competition among the local governments.  
This takes advantage of the rivalry among the local-heads that are eager to earn better 
grades from independent evaluators. The problem is that the central and the provincial 
governments themselves do not have the capacity or the means to support a fair 
competition including the system to eradicate corruption. The implications are that the 
central and provincial governments are not free from bias practice in implementing their 
policy. Therefore, in the initial phase, there is a need for a third-party involvement such 
as donors or NGOs that are neutral and trustworthy. These organizations can assist in 
cultivating fair competition among the regional governments as well as coach the 
central and provincial government to build their capacity. 
 
 
                                                   
32 For example, Hidayat (2006) has reviewed various cases on the relations or collusions between the 
local-head candidate and the local business circle during the local-head elections. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
Direct local-head elections in Indonesia, which is still centered towards centralistic 
political parties, have been carried out under decentralization of government 
administration and democratization. Therefore, the authority of the government is 
delegated from the central level to the local level but this is taken as an advantage by the 
local-head to strengthen his/her power and create a “local centralization”. Under this 
concept, the “local government autonomy” has difficulty to attach itself to the ‘citizen 
autonomy’ that should have been further delegated from the local government to the 
people. In Indonesia, the government was not derived from the people such as in 
western countries, but it functions as a controller and regulator of the people. There is 
still a wide communication gap between the government and the people due to 
unsynchronized measures from both sides. 
 Decentralization and regional autonomy encourages locality and specific local traits. 
This is often used by the political elite as political symbols to intensify their power. As a 
result, it is quite difficult to tone down the strong paternalistic and feudalistic 
atmosphere in Eastern Indonesia. In fact, apparently this mode has become even 
stronger after the local-head elections. In implementing the government system from the 
central to regions, the presidential system was applied through the local-head elections.  
The local-head elections have the tendency to produce local-heads that are more like 
“kings” rather than “managers”. Yet, at the same time, independent and active public 
that share the responsibility in ensuring regional development should support the 
presidential system. 
 The regional development policy under such government administration depends on 
the ability of the individual local-head to “manage” the government. The system of 
local-head elections is deemed as a turning point of democratization in Indonesia, which 
started in 1998. However, the trend of emerging “kingdoms” does not necessarily equal 
to democratization. This is the so-called ‘democratization paradox’ reviewed in this 
chapter. Is the trend growing stronger? What are the implications on regional 
development policy towards better public service and for the enhancement of the 
people’s prosperity? Is there any improvement in the communication between the 
government and the people in accommodating the public initiatives in the regional 
development policy? 
 In this perspective, there are two focal points to be discussed within the context of 
regional development policy and local government. Firstly, how can we improve the 
capacity of the local-head as a “manager” rather than as a “king”? One of the solutions 
is to encourage fair competition on good regional public policy between the local-heads 
under the facilitation of central government or the provincial government. However, 
these governments’ ability to manage this, at the central and provincial level, is still 
questionable due to the lack of experience and the vested interests surrounding them. 
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Therefore, if the government lacks capacity, apparently there might be a need to involve 
third parties such as CSO/NGOs or foreign institutions in the initial stage. To re-align 
the directions of the regional government, there needs to be a conducive competition 
among the local-heads towards good public policy. 
 Secondly, to what extent is the relationship between the local government and the 
people in practicing the regional development policy? The term pembangunan 
(development), that is often associated with physical development, has influenced the 
practice of development in the regions. The local government and the people distrust 
one another and both have not been able to establish a harmonized and mutual 
collaboration. There are two possibilities in improving the communication channel of 
both sides, that is: (1) the local government changes its own mindset first and then tries 
to approach the people with a new move; or (2) the people themselves improve their 
capacity to manage the community democratically and push the government to change 
their mindset and behavior. It is necessary to observe the process of democratization and 
its further impact on the relationship between the local government and the people. As 
an example, the public financial management in the village level is one aspect that could 
be reviewed particularly in relation to poverty alleviation programs or Village Fund 
Allocation (ADD) from the District/Municipality government to the villages. 
Therefore, there needs to be further research on the possibility of establishing fair 
competition in regional development policy among the local-heads, and review the 
relationship between the local government and the people in the process of 
implementing the regional development policy. These two focal points will generate 
directives and necessary inputs for the process of regional development policy within 
the context of sustainable democratization in Indonesia. 
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